Abstract-Mobile peer-to-peer groups, which do not require any pre-deployed infrastructure or trusted centralized author ity are valuable for a variety of collaborative applications. This work is focused on how to securely admit new users to such groups. Existing mechanisms based on threshold cryptography require that prospective members collect sufficient number of individual votes from the group prior to obtaining a member ship credential. However, this approach does not consider the desirable anonymity of group members towards the admitted or declined users. This paper presents an admission control mechanism in which group members decide collectively and notify prospective members on the outcome of their decision without revealing their identities to prospective members.
required to grant the access to the group. This policy may work well in static groups, however if the number of group members falls below the specified fixed value then alter native policies are required. The dynamic admission policy requires a certain fraction v of votes to allow a prospective member become part of the group. Obviously, this policy is more flexible and suitable for mobile peer-to-peer groups. The dynamic admission policy is also fairer because every prospective member requires the same percentage of votes to be admitted to the group, whereas for the static policy this percentage depends on the actual group size.
In this paper we propose an admission control protocol for mobile peer-to-peer groups based on the dynamic admission policy. We show how founding members can initialize the group, how members can collectively decide about the admission of other users, and how a group member can prove own membership in the group towards other group members and also non-members. Unlike existing admission control schemes (c.f. Section II) we focus on privacy issues during the admission process. In particular, we wish to protect anonymity of users participating in the collective decision phase. In this context we consider anonymity of users towards the admitted or declined users during and after the admission phase as a prime privacy-preserving goal. We show that this goal is not provided by current solutions where prospective group members are required to collect individual confirmation votes from the group members; thus, being able to learn the identities of group members who voted for the admission and deduce the identities of group members who did not vote. Especially for collaborative applications this lack of anonymity is undesirable, since admitted group members may object collaboration with group members who did not express their consent. In order to meet this anonymity goal we our solution uses several modern cryptographic techniques.
Section VI describes some additional features of our protocol for securing diverse forms of communication within and beyond the group.
II. RELATED WORK AND ANALYSIS
Kim et al. [7] proposed an admission control framework suitable for different kinds of peer groups and suggested some realizations using various cryptographic techniques. Their framework relies on two basic elements: group charter and group authority. Group charter is a document which contains information about the group including the admis sion rules. Group authority is the entity which decides about group membership requests. The framework includes various admission policy types depending on the structure of the group authority: (i) public access control lists (ACLs) which can be used without any group authority; (ii) admission decision made by a centralized group authority (e.g. a group manager or a trusted third party), and (iii) admission decision made collectively by current group members. Obviously, public ACLs are unsuitable for dynamic mobile peer-to-peer groups because all prospective group members should be known in advance which is an unrealistic assumption. The centralized admission decision made by a group manager or a trusted third party violates the trust relationship in such groups where no such trusted parties are available. Hence, the admission policy based on collective decisions is surely the most suitable form for mobile peer-to-peer groups. The framework in [7] uses the notion of group membership certificates (GMCs) that allow members to prove own group membership. Every group member obtains own GMC by the end of the admission protocol.
Saxena et. al. [13] proposed an abstract model for the access control protocol based on the framework from [7] and provided three concrete realizations. The difference to [7] is that upon collecting enough approval votes prospective user U computes own GMC without further interaction. All three protocol use secret sharing techniques and require secure p2p-channels between the founding group members. All these protocols rely on the static admission policy since the threshold value used in the secret sharing scheme remains constant.
In an earlier work [10] , Narasimha et al. described a solution based on RSA threshold signatures. Similar to [13] their protocols are expensive in terms of computation and communication and require secure point-to-point channels between participants during the initialization and the admis sion protocol. Also, group members who wish to approve U's request need to redistribute their threshold shares.
Later, Saxena et al. [14] described another admission control protocol for MANETs and P2P networks. The dif ference to the previous approaches is that members use their identities (which are bound to public keys) to compute the secret shares. Their protocol also distinguishes between internal and external group membership proofs.
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Further, Saxena et al. [15] proposed two admission control protocols (UniAC and BiAC) for short-lived mobile ad-hoc networks. The difference to the previous approaches is that members do not require own membership certificates and are able to prove their membership over commitments to their secret shares derived from the shared polynomial. Similar to [13] the protocols can be initialized using a joint secret shar ing scheme from [4] . However, the UniAC protocol is based on secret sharing with univariate polynomials f (x) which re sults in a more efficient initialization procedure compared to the BiAC protocol which uses bivariate polynomials f(x, y).
This efficiency of the initialization in UniAC is achieved at the expense of the admission protocol since secret shares of t members who wish to approve the admission request have to be randomized using the inefficient random shuffling technique from [5] in order to prevent U from learning their secret shares. The additional strength of UniAC and BiAC protocols is that group members Ui and U j after being admitted to the group are able to establish a secret key for the communication without additional interaction. This is a valuable property because pairwise key establishment is a frequent operation in peer-to-peer networks. We note that our protocol provides not only this property but goes a step further in setting up a secret key known to all group members as discussed in Section VI.
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR SOLUTION
All proposals briefly described in Section II have the following common form: a prospective member U* has to collect at least t votes signed by current group mem bers before U* can join to the group. Moreover, these votes must be transmitted confidentially through a secure communication channel. It is implicitly assumed that such channels exist. In practice, this transmission would, however, reveal the identities of voting members to the prospective members. Since the identities of group members (through their certificates) are publicly known U* would be able to distinguish between members who have explicitly approved his admission and members who did not.
In order to achieve the desired anonymity of voters we apply a different technique: we let the founding group members execute a group key exchange (GKE) protocol in order to agree on a secret shared group key k. A crucial security requirement of GKE protocols is that the established group key k remains known only to the participants of the protocol. Moreover, GKE execution does not require any secure channels amongst the users and can be performed over a public, insecure network. Once the group is initialized any prospective member U* can send own membership request to the group. Then, current group members can exchange their votes encrypted with k and in case the number of positive votes exceeds the fraction v a new session of GKE protocol is executed in which U* is considered as a new protocol participant, i.e. each group key is valid for the period between two successful admission procedures. The important property of our approach is that the voting phase itself does not involve U* , i.e. the voting process is carried out amongst the members of the group and the individual votes remain hidden from U* due to the applied encryption.
During the voting phase we let each user sign his own vote before encrypting it with the group key. In this way we ensure that the same user submits at most one vote per admission procedure. In our admission protocol each Ui is in possession of a private/public key pair (ski, pki) which will be used to generate and verify these signatures.
A key pair (ski, pki) is, however, bound to the preceding execution of the GKE protocol and remains valid between two consecutive admission events. In this way we ensure that if Ui is in possession of Ski for some pki that has been used in the preceding GKE execution then Ui is a valid member of the group.
We will use a special class of GKE protocols according to the following definition from [9] (here slightly modified to suit the context):
Definition 1 (GKE+P Protocol): A group key exchange protocol enabling on-demand derivation of p2p keys (GKE+P) amongst n users Ul, ... ,Un consists of an inter active group phase at the end of which participants compute a shared group key kG and an on-demand executable non interactive p2p phase in which any two users Ui and U j derive their own secret p2p key ki, j .
As shown in [9] such GKE+P protocols can be constructed from any GroupDH protocols, i.e. GKE protocols that gener alize the classical two-party key exchange protocol from [3] to a group setting as defined in the following (here slightly modified to suit the context):
Definition 2 (GroupDH Protocol): Let G be a cyclic group of prime order Q and g E G its generator. It is assumed that the Discrete Logarithm Problem 1 is intractable in G.
A GroupDH protocol is a GKE protocol amongst n users U 1, ... , Un such that during its execution each user Ui chooses own exponent Xi ER ZQ and at the end all users compute a secret shared group element kE G which is the output of f(g, Xl> ••• ,x n) for some function f :
Some GroupDH protocols like [16] , [1] , [6] , [8] require that each user Ui chooses own exponent Xi ER ZQ in the first protocol round and broadcasts the corresponding public value Yi = gX;. However, (Xi, Yi) can also be seen as a Discrete Logarithm-based asymmetric key pair (ski, pki) of Ui. Since (Xi, Yi) is used to compute the group key k we immediately have a link between the public key pki = Yi of Ui and the execution of the GKE+P protocol. Therefore, we can setup a group by executing the GKE+P protocol and consider pki = Yi as a public key of group member Ui.
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In the admission control protocol we can let each Ui sign own votes with Ski = Xi so that other group members will be able to verify these signatures using pki whereby being assured that the signature has been produced by a legitimate member of the group.
IV. PRIVACy-PRESERVING ADMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL

A. Building Blocks
In the following we list the three cryptographic building blocks of our construction.
GKE+P Protocol P: Let P denote a GKE+P protocol from Definition 1 which is in turn based on a GroupDH protocol from Definition 2 during which each user Ui chooses own secret exponent Xi and broadcasts the corresponding public value Yi in the first round. As mentioned earlier, such GroupDH protocol can be found in [16] , [1] , [6] , [8] .
A GKE+P protocol P is called secure if the group key k remains indistinguishable from some random value of the same length to any party which was not a legitimate participant of the protocol session in which k was established. In particular, each new session of P results in a new group key which is independent from any key computed in some other (earlier or later) session.
Digital Signature Scheme �: A digital signature scheme � consists of the signing and verification algorithms (Sig,Ver). By a := Sig(sk,m) we denote the signature on a message m computed using the private key sk. The verification algorithm Ver(pk, m, a) returns true if the signature on m is valid under the public key pk; otherwise the algorithm returns false.
A digital signature scheme � is called existentially un forgeable under chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) if it is infeasible for a given public key pk to compute (m, a) such that Ver(pk, m, a) = true after obtaining valid message signature pairs (m', a ' ) for m i=-m'.
Since in our protocol we will have (sk, pk) = (x, y) with Y = gX the appropriate EUF-CMA secure signature schemes is, for example, DSA from [12] . Symmetric Encryption Scheme £: A symmetric encryption scheme £ such as AES from [11] consists of the encryption and decryption algorithms (Ene, Dee). By c = Ene(k, m) we denote the encryption of a message m using the symmetric key k. The corresponding decryption Dee(k, c) returns m.
A symmetric encryption scheme � is called indistin guishable under chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) if for any random key k it is infeasible to distinguish between Co = Ene(k, mo) and Cl = Ene(k, ml) for any chosen mo i=-ml after obtaining decryptions m' = Dee(k, c ' ) for any chosen c ' i=-Co i=-Cl·
B. Group Charter
A group charter GC contains at least the following entries: a group id G, the admission fraction v (as explained in the context of the dynamic admission policy in Section I), and the current group public key PK. We assume that G and v are agreed upon in advance, while P K is initially set to be empty.
C. Initial Group Formation
In order to initialize G the founding members UI, ••• ,Un execute a session of the GKE+P protocol P. At the end of the protocol each Ui holds the group key k = I(g, Xb " " xn), own private/public key pair (ski, pki) = (Xi, Yi) as well as public keys of all other group members (pkl' ... ,pkn) = (Yb ... , Yn). Then, each Ui computes the group public key PK := (pkb ... ,pkn) and broadcasts the signature O'i = Sig(ski, GC) where GC = (G, v, PK). Finally every group member Ui verifies each received 0' j , computes S = (O'b ... , an), and stores (GC, S); this in addition to the secret values k and Ski. The signature set S serves as an authenticator for the group charter GC. Since no centralized infrastructure is deployed all members have to authenticate GC collectively.
D. Our Admission Control Protocol
A prospective group member U* can join the group G if at least a fraction v of current group members approves his admission request sent to the group. Our privacy-preserving admission control protocol consists of four stages detailed in the following.
Stage 1 (GC Fetch) U* obtains (GC, S) and verifies the validity of the group charter GC by verifying each signature O'i in S using the appropriate public key pki from P K (which is part of GC). Stage 2 (Join Request) U* proceeds as follows:
• choose x* ER ZQ; compute y* = gX ' ;
• define (sk*, pk*) = (x*, y*);
• compute 0'* = Sig(sk*, GC);
• broadcast U*lpk*IO'* to the members of G. Stage 3 (CoUective Decision) Every group member Ui from G proceeds as follows:
• set votei either to accept or decline;
• compute O'i = Sig(ski' voteiIU*lpk*IGC);
• compute Ci = Enc(k, voteiIU*lpk*IGClO'i);
• broadcast Ci' Upon receiving encrypted votes C j from all other group members each Ui proceeds as follows:
• decrypt each vote j IU*lpk*IGClO' j = Dec(k, c j );
• verify that each Ver(pk j , vote j IU*lpk*IGC, O' j ) = true;
• discard votes with invalid signatures and votes of users who voted twice;
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• if the number of valid votes with value accept satisfies the admission fraction v then continue with Stage 4; otherwise abort (meaning that U* will not be admitted to the group and P K remains unmodified). Stage 4 (Group Admission) Users Ub ... ,Un and U* ex ecute a new session of a GKE+P protocol P. For simplicity we set U* = Un+l. At the end of the protocol each Ui holds the updated group key k = I(g, Xb ... ,Xn, Xn+l) where Xl, ... ,Xn E ZQ are new exponents chosen respectively by Ub ... ,Un in this session (i.e. replacing their exponents from the previous session) and xn+ I (= x*) is the exponent chosen by the new member Un+l in Stage 2. Thus, this execution implies the update of all (ski, pki) for i E [l,n] and so of the group public key PK = (pkl, ... ,pkn+1) in the GC.
In order to complete the protocol members have to collectively update the authenticator S of GC. This is done similarly to the initialization phase from Section IV-C.
I.e., each Ui broadcasts the signature O'i = Sig(ski' GC) where GC = (G, v, P K) and stores (GC, S) where S = (O'b . .. ,O'n+l).
E. Proof of Group Membership
Any group member Ui can prove own group membership to some verifier V (whereby V can be some other group member or some third party) by proving the knowledge of the secret key Ski = Xi for which the corresponding public key pki is part of the current group public key P K from GC. This proof can be done via a simple challenge-response protocol, e.g. Ui signs some challenge r chosen by V, that is computes O'i = Sig(ski' r ) . Note that this proof is implicitly used in Stage 3 of our protocol to prevent double-voting.
Another property of our solution is that Ui can also prove own group membership to V without disclosing own public key pki• If V is some third party then Ui can use the (non interactive) zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of l-out of-2 discrete logarithms from [2] extended to a l-out-of-n version, i.e. Ui proves to V the knowledge of some loga Yi from loga Yl. ... , loga Yn without revealing the index i.
If V is another group member, say U j , then Ui and U j can authenticate each other as group members using the shared group key k. Since k is known to all members this authentication does not provide non-repudiation within the group.
V. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Desirable Security Requirements
One of basic security requirements for an admission control protocol is that no user can claim to be a member of some group if this user has not been admitted to that group before. This requirement intuitively assumes that users should not be able to forge their group membership proofs. This intuition serves as a basis for the following informal definition of unforgeability.
Definition 3 (Unforgeability): It must be computationally infeasible for a user U to prove the group membership in some group G without having own membership being approved through the admission control protocol.
While unforgeability is a necessary security requirement for any admission control protocol, it does not cover the desired aspects of privacy. In particular, our goal was to achieve privacy of votes during the admission phase against prospective group members. This can be done by requiring that prospective members do not obtain any information about the individual votes of group members. Our informal definition of anonymity given below is more general as it aims to protect the anonymity of votes against any non-member U.
Definition 4 (Anonymity): It must be computationally infeasible for a user U who was not a member of G during the execution of the admission control protocol to obtain any information about the individual votes votei of group members Ui.
We remark that (as discussed in Section II) the anonymity requirement implicitly prevents any prospective member U from being able to distinguish between group members who approve or disapprove his join request. In particular, our definition also allows that U is admitted to the group at some later stage; thus, we also ensure anonymity of votes "in the future".
B. Security Analysis of Our Protocol
In this section we argue informally that our protocol from Section IV-D satisfies the desirable security requirements of unforgeability and anonymity defined in the previous paragraph if secure primitives, i.e. GKE+P protocol p, digital signature scheme E, and symmetric encryption scheme £, are used.
Unforgeability : Assume that some user U j can prove own membership in G without being previously admitted to G. In this case U j must be able to output signature a j such that Ver(pki, a j , m ) = true for some pki in PK. Since the signature scheme is assumed to be EUF CMA secure this may occur only with negligible probability.
Anonymity: Assume that votei submitted by some group member Ui during the Stage 3 of our protocol leaks some in formation, i.e. it is possible to distinguish whether votei was set to accept or decline. Since each votei is encrypted in Ci this attack would mean that the ciphertext produced by the underlying encryption scheme £ leaks information about the encrypted plaintext. Since £ is assumed to be IND-CCA secure and the secret group key k is known only to group 115 members as guaranteed by the security of the used GKE+P protocol P this may occur only with negligible probability.
VI. ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES OF OUR PROTOCOL
Our privacy-preserving admission control protocol provides some further useful properties with regard to the communication in the peer-to-peer group: Secure Group Communication: The secret group key k can be used by all group members to communicate securely within a group, i.e. this form of communication is given implicitly through the use of our protocol for the purpose of the admission. This is in contrast to admission protocols from [7] , [10] , [13] , [14] , [15] where secure group communication would require a separate execution of a GKE protocol.
Secure Peer-to-Peer Communication: Our protocol uses a GKE+P protocol as a building block. The distinguished feature of GKE+P protocols is that in addition to the secret group key any protocol participant Ui can derive an independent secret peer-to-peer key ki, j for any other participant U j without any further communication.
Therefore, our admission control protocol implicitly provides group members with the ability to communicate securely on a peer-to-peer basis. Note that secure peer-to peer communication is also provided by the BiAC protocol from [15] .
Secure Communication with Non-Members: Since in our protocol each Ui holds own private/public key pair (Ski, pki) as a result of the underlying GKE+P protocol any non member can send some confidential message m to any group member using some asymmetric public key encryption scheme and encrypting m with pki.
Furthermore, the secret group key k can be used to derive an asymmetric key pair (ska, pka). The public key pka can then be used by any non-member to send some confidential message to the whole group.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a new approach for the admission control in mobile peer-to-peer groups where group members collectively approve or decline the joining request of some user while remaining anonymous to that user. The anonymity of voting members remains preserved against the admitted group members. In addition to the desired privacy goals our protocol provides support for secure group and peer-to-peer communication both within the same group and between members of the group and non members.
